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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jose Prater appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony domestic battery of his
girlfriend. At trial, the district court admitted the girlfriend’s prior consistent statements on the
alleged battery. The girlfriend’s statements, however, were made after she had the motive to lie
and, as such, were inadmissible. The district court therefore abused its discretion by admitting
these hearsay statements. Due to the improperly admitted evidence, this Court should vacate
Mr. Prater’s judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 24 and 25, 2016, Mr. Prater and his girlfriend, Julia Barnett
(“Ms. Barnett”), got into an argument at their residence. (R., p.14.) Ms. Barnett alleged the
argument “turned physical,” and Mr. Prater injured her. (R., p.14.) Mr. Prater and Ms. Barnett’s
two children were present, as well as Ms. Barnett’s child from a previous relationship. (R., p.14.)
Consequently, the State alleged Mr. Prater committed the crime of felony domestic battery in the
presence of children, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-903(a), -918(2), (4). (R., pp.16–17.) The
magistrate held a preliminary hearing, and Mr. Prater was bound over to district court. (R., pp.33,
35; see also Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.4, L.1–p.17, L.13.1) The State charged him with one count of
felony domestic battery in the presence of children. (R., pp.38–39.) Mr. Prater pled not guilty
and proceeded to trial. (R., pp.43–44.)
At trial, the State called Ms. Barnett, her sister Letisa Barnett (“Letisa”), and Officer
Larry Hemmert, a police officer with City of Caldwell. (See Tr., p.97, L.1–p.165, L.15.) The
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The preliminary hearing transcript is included in the record as an exhibit.
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district court also admitted fourteen photographs of Ms. Barnett’s injuries. (Tr., p.117, L.4–
p.123, L.14; State’s Exs.1–14.) The State rested, and Mr. Prater testified in his defense.
(Tr., p.165, L.19, p.172, L.1–p.213, L.13.) He denied the charge and claimed Ms. Barnett was
the aggressor. (See generally p.172, L.1–p.213, L.13.) After the defense rested, the State called
Ms. Barnett in rebuttal. (Tr., p.213, L.15, p.214, L.11–p.231, L.9.)
The district court instructed the jury on felony domestic battery and the lesser-included
offense of misdemeanor battery. (Tr., p.242, L.22–p.245, L.11; R., pp.85–86.) The jury found
Mr. Prater guilty of felony domestic battery in the presence of children. (Tr., p.277, Ls.5–21.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Prater to seven years, with three years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction. (Tr., p.298, Ls.11–17.) Mr. Prater timely appealed from the district court’s judgment
of conviction. (R., pp.118–19, 120–22.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting Ms. Barnett’s prior consistent statements
to rebut a charge of recent fabrication because her motive to lie preceded her statements?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Ms. Barnett’s Prior Consistent
Statements To Rebut A Charge Of Recent Fabrication Because Her Motive To Lie Preceded Her
Statements
A.

Introduction
Mr. Prater challenges the district court’s admission of Ms. Barnett’s prior consistent

statements to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication. To admit prior consistent
statements, the declarant must make the statements before he or she has the motive to lie. Here,
Ms. Barnett already had a motive to lie when she made the statements, so her statements were
inadmissible. By admitting these statements, the district court failed to act consistently with the
applicable legal standards and thus abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence and its

decision to admit evidence will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that
discretion.” State v. Lopez-Orozco, 159 Idaho 375, 377 (2015) (quoting State v. Robinett, 141
Idaho 110, 112 (2005)).
A three point inquiry is used to determine whether a trial court has abused its
discretion: (1) whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 6 (2013) (quoting State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 686 (2012)). An
abuse of discretion argument must specifically identify the misapplied factor(s) by the district
court. State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 575 n.2 (2017).
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C.

The District Court Failed To Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards And
Thus Abused Its Discretion Because Ms. Barnett’s Prior Consistent Statements Were Not
Made Prior To Her Motive To Lie
Hearsay, an out of court statement admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, is

generally inadmissible. Idaho Rule of Evidence (“I.R.E.”) 801(a)–(c), 802. Certain statements,
however, are deemed nonhearsay by the evidentiary rules and thus admissible. I.R.E. 801(d).
One form of nonhearsay is a prior consistent statement to rebut a charge of fabrication. These
statements are not hearsay if:
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . (B) consistent with declarant’s
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against declarant of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive; or, to rehabilitate the
declarant’s credibility as a witness when attacked on another ground . . . .
I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). These statements are admissible as substantive evidence (i.e., for the truth of
the matter asserted) and “to rebut an attack on the witness’ credibility.” Tome v. United States,
513 U.S. 150, 157 (1995) (interpreting the federal rule); Minutes of Meeting on May 8, 2015,
Evidence Rules Advisory Committee, available at https://isc.idaho.gov/orders/minutes/
IRE_EvidenceRulesCommittee_5.8.15.pdf

(recognizing

prior

consistent

statements

are

admissible for “substantive use”); but see State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 732 (2001) (“Such
statements are not hearsay, because the statement is not being offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the declaration but to show the credibility of the witness.”)
To admit prior consistent statements under I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), the statements must be
made before the declarant had a motive to lie. In State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1 (2013), this Court
“explicitly” held “that the Rule only permits introduction of out-of-court statements that were
made prior to the time when the declarant would have a motive to lie.” Id. at 14. In Joy, for
example, the State introduced the victim/witness’s prior consistent statements from the
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preliminary hearing, but this Court determined the statements were inadmissible because the
victim/witness “would have had a motive for fabrication regarding the events on the night in
question prior to her testimony at the preliminary hearing.” Id. “Consequently,” this Court held,
“the evidence was not proper under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) because the preliminary hearing testimony
did not precede her motive to lie.” Id.
Here, the district court abused its discretion by admitting multiple prior consistent
statements of Ms. Barnett to rebut Mr. Prater’s charge of recent fabrication. On direct
examination, Ms. Barnett testified that, on the evening of December 24, Mr. Prater slapped,
kicked, and pushed her. (See Tr., p.104, L.13–p.106, L.20.) After this, she tried to leave with the
children, but Mr. Prater threw an alcoholic drink (Hpnotiq) on her. (Tr., p.106, L.23–p.107,
L.14.) She testified that Mr. Prater “called 911” and “called me in for DUI and told me that if I
left with the kids that I would get arrested and that I would lose them.” (Tr., p.107, Ls.15–20.)
Ms. Barnett explained that she then called her mother and her sister, Letisa, and left with them.
(See Tr., p.107, L.21–p.109, L.5.) The next day, December 25, Ms. Barnett testified that she
returned to their residence and Mr. Prater pushed and hit her again. (Tr., p.112, Ls.13–18.)
During Mr. Prater’s cross-examination of Ms. Barnett, he implied she fabricated the
battery because she was angry with him for calling the police on her for a DUI. (Tr. p.137, Ls.2–
22, p.142, Ls.16–23.) Mr. Prater also implied Ms. Barnett fabricated the domestic battery since,
according to Mr. Prater, Ms. Barnett sent him a text message about calling the police on her and
“cross[ing] that line,” but never about the alleged battery. (Tr., p.141, L.10–p.144, L.23.) As to
these questions, Ms. Barnett testified that she did not remember whether she texted Mr. Prater
about the battery, but she was “pretty sure” that she did. Tr., p.141, L.10–p.144, L.23.)
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Next, when Letisa testified, the State sought to introduce Ms. Barnett’s statement to
Letisa when she came to pick her up on December 24:
Q. BY MR. PASKETT [(prosecutor)]: Okay. Did you talk to her?
A. Yes, briefly
Q. What did she say to you?
MR. DOWELL [(defense counsel)]: Objection. Hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. PASKETT: Your Honor, it’s a prior consistent statement. Her testimony has
been questioned as to recent fabrication on cross-examination by Mr. Dowell.
THE COURT: Any response, Mr. Dowell.
MR. DOWELL: I guess I don’t even know what was said.
THE COURT: Well, go ahead and answer the question.
THE WITNESS: Okay. She said that they had recently gotten into a fight, that he
threw a drink in her face, and he called her in for a DUI.
(Tr., p.154, L.11–p.155, L.3 (emphasis added).) Later on in trial, the State introduced
Ms. Barnett’s statements to Officer Hemmert, who took her report on December 27. (Tr., p.159,
Ls.8–18.) The State asked Officer Hemmert what Ms. Barnett told him about how she got the
injuries. (Tr., p.160, L.19.) Mr. Prater objected on hearsay grounds. (Tr., p.160, L.20.) The
district court first sustained the objection, but the prosecutor again asserted the hearsay
statements were admissible as prior consistent statements. (Tr., p.160, Ls.21–25.) The prosecutor
explained that Mr. Prater called into question Ms. Barnett’s motive to fabricate because
Mr. Prater asked her about not confronting him via text message and the 911 call for the DUI.
(Tr., p.161, Ls.8–23.) In response to the prosecutor’s argument, Mr. Prater stated, “I don’t think I
need to add anything.” (Tr., p.161, L.24.) The district court allowed the prosecutor to question
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Officer Hemmert “generally it was a report for domestic battery” and “specifically . . . why it
wasn’t reported earlier,” but the prosecutor could not “get into a whole additional report.”
(Tr., p.161, L.25–p.162, L.5.) The prosecutor elicited the following testimony:
Q. Officer Hemmert, did Julia report that the defendant had battered her?
A. Yes.
Q. On the 24th?
A. Yes.
Q. And on the 25th?
A. Yes.
Q. Did she indicate that the injuries she had were from that battery?
A. She did.
Q. Did she indicate whether or not her children were present?
A. Yes.
Q. What did she say with regard to that?
A. She stated her three children were present during the batteries.
Q. In the home?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did she indicate whether or not the defendant had thrown a drink on her?
A. She did.
Q. What did she say?
A. She said that he had thrown beer on her.
Q. And are you sure it was beer or whether it was just a drink?
A. I believe she said beer.
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Q. And did she indicate to you whether the defendant had or had threatened to call
911 and call her in for a DUI if she left?
A. Yes.
(Tr., p.162, L.7–p.163, L.11.) The district court did not instruct the jury that Letisa’s or Officer
Hemmert’s testimony on Ms. Barnett’s statements were offered for a limited purpose.
Mr. Prater asserts the district court’s admission of Ms. Barnett’s prior consistent
statements was inconsistent with the applicable legal standards because Ms. Barnett had the
motive to lie before she made the statements. The evidence shows Ms. Barnett had the motive to
lie about the alleged battery once Mr. Prater threw an alcoholic drink on her and called 911 to
report a DUI. As such, her motive arose shortly after the first alleged battery on December 24,
and she made her statements to Letisa and Officer Hemmert after she had the motive. Her
statement to Letisa occurred later that evening, and her statements to Officer Hemmert occurred
three days later on December 27. Therefore, this evidence was not properly admitted under
I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) because Ms. Barnett’s prior consistent statements “did not precede her
motive to lie.” Joy, 155 Idaho at 14.
Because this evidence does not qualify as nonhearsay under I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), it was
inadmissible hearsay. Ms. Barnett’s statement to Letisa —“they had recently gotten into a fight,
that he threw a drink in her face, and he called her in for a DUI”—is an out-of-court statement
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. I.R.E. 801(c). Likewise, Officer Hemmert’s
recitation of Ms. Barnett’s “report” to him, quoted above, is replete with hearsay. A statement for
hearsay purposes “is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by the person as an assertion.” I.R.E. 801(a). “The hearsay rule not only prohibits
repetition of the actual out-of-court statement; it also applies where the witness attempts to
convey the substance or purport of the statement.” State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 704 (Ct. App.
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1994); see also State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 922 (2015) (holding testimony was hearsay
because, although witness did not recount precise details, witness “conveyed the substance”).
Here, Officer Hemmert’s testimony included not only Ms. Barnett’s direct oral assertions to him
(“She stated her three children were present during the batteries,” and “She said that he had
thrown beer on her”), but also responses that conveyed the substance of Ms. Barnett’s
statements. Officer Hemmert’s affirmative responses to Ms. Barnett “indicat[ing]” “the
defendant had battered her” on “the 24th” and “the 25th,” “the injuries she had were from that
battery,” and “the defendant had or had threatened to call 911 and call her in for a DUI if she
left” were attempts to convey the substance of Ms. Barnett’s statements. Officer Hemmert’s
testimony, quoted above, consisted of out of court statements offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted: Ms. Barnett said to Officer Hemmert (1) Mr. Prater battered her on December
24 and 25; (2) her injuries were from the battery; and (3) Mr. Prater did or threatened to call 911
for the DUI. These hearsay statements were inadmissible.
In summary, the district court failed to act consistently with the applicable legal standards
by admitting Ms. Barnett’s prior consistent statements because her statements did not satisfy the
requirements of admission under I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). The district court therefore abused its
discretion by admitting this evidence. Moreover, the State cannot prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the erroneous admission of this evidence was harmless. Ms. Barnett’s prior consistent
statements plainly bolstered the State’s version of the facts and Ms. Barnett’s credibility. Due to
this prejudicial error, this Court should vacate Mr. Prater’s judgment of conviction and remand
his case for a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Prater respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand
his case for a new trial.
DATED this 19th day of April, 2018.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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